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Abstract
A structural model of job search with endogenous search decision is 
estimated from a panel of Candian women who have suffered a perma­
nent job displacement. The model allows us to estimate child care costs 
parameters and to infer the effects of young children on the decision to 
search, on the probability of receiving an offer, on female reservation 
wages and on female unemployment duration. Finally, the behavioural 
distinction between single and lone others is also investigated.
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Theoretical and empirical models of household behaviour in presence of young 
children have received an enormous attention in recent years. As households 
must devote important monetary resources and significant periods of time to 
child care activities, the fact that children have a significant impact on house­
hold’s time allocation decisions is hardly questionable. Child care activities, 
as any investment decisions, are the outcome of intertemporal decision making 
under uncertainty and therefore require economists modeling its surrounding 
aspects to use stochastic dynamic models of individual behaviour.
Apart from challenging theoretical and econometric issues, the impact of 
young children on the labour market has enormous interest for labour market 
policies. Economists have investigated the impact that young children have on 
household consumption and household labour supply (see Browning and Meghir, 
1991 for an illustration or Browning, 1992, for a survey). As in many households, 
the woman devotes more time to child care activities, special attention has 
been paid to the connections between female labor supply and the presence of 
young children. Although it is widely accepted that children reduce both the 
likelihood to participate and hours of work (for those who work), the economic 
interpretation of this result is rendered difficult by the fact that both family sizes 
and labour supply are potentially endogenous. Furthermore, similar problems 
arise in investigating the effects that children have on hours of work (for those 
who work). 1
Other authors have chosen to investigate the indirect effects of children 
by measuring the earnings penalty for women who must interrupt their careers 
to involve in child care activities and several of them have found a negative 
relationship between fertility and female wages. This negative relationship has 
however very little to do with fertility itself but more with the duration and 
the incidence of the work interruptions. This branch of the literature (which 
dates back to Mincer and Polachek, 1974) has attracted a lot of criticisms by 
individuals who have questioned the robustness of the results. Surprisingly, the 
misspecification of female earnings functions used in previous studies has only 
raised interest very recently despite the fact that reported estimates were likely 
to suffer heterogeneity, endogeneity and self-selectivity biases. Recent work



























































































by Kim and Polachek (1994) and Light and Ureta (1995) have addressed the 
heterogeneity bias while Belzil, Sims and Hergel (1995) and Belzil and Hergel 
(1995) have addressed both the selectivity and the endogeneity bias issues.2
As the empirical literature is dominated by estimations of labour supply 
functions (or earnings functions) in which a children status variable is included 
on the right hand side, it can be criticized for disregarding female unemploy­
ment. Indeed, a large majority of the empirical literature devoted to job search 
and unemployment duration is applied to young males and assumes that work­
ers, exogenously displaced, start immediately searching for a new job (see van 
den Berg, 1991, Eckstein and Wolpin, 1990 or Wolpin, 1987 for some exam­
ples). Although this might be a reasonable assumption for young males who 
become unemployed, it is not necessarily for female displaced workers. Just 
like labor supply decisions are likely affected by the presence of young children, 
both the decision to search and the search behaviour of unemployed women 
are likely sensitive to the presence of young children.3 Women who have given 
birth (s) prior to a job separation will face child care costs which they did not 
face in previous spells of unemployment or when they entered the labor force. 
Consequently, this should affect their decision to search or not as well as their 
re-employment reservation wage. Furthermore, given that child care activities 
(as well as job search activities) are time consuming, women must also take into 
account that the offer probability can be substantially affected by the presence 
of young children.
This paper is concerned with the econometric modeling of the search be­
haviour of women who are displaced and must then reassess the optimality of 
labour force participation. Our main objective is to specify and estimate a 
model which can accurately describe several aspects of the sequence of choices 
made by unemployed women with young children. The model, developed in 
the next section, is constructed as a stationary search model but incorporates 
three important modifications; the incorporation of the decision to search or 
to drop out from the labour market, the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity 
in the value of non-market time and observable heterogeneity in the value of
2Belzil, Sims and Hergel (1995) argue that, to a large extent, the negative parameter 
estimates obtained generally for the earnings loss due to labor market interruptions is driven 
by the misspecification of the earnings regression functions. Kim and Polachek (1994) and 
Light and Ureta (1995) also report an enormous sensitivity of their parameter estimates when 
methods of estimation more general than ordinary least squares are used.
3Swaim and Podgursky (1994) is one of very few exceptions. The authors estimate the 
effect of job displacement on a sample of American women using a reduced-form model of 




























































































unemployment (captured from individual variations in UI benefit and in num­
ber of children) and the explicit treatment of child care costs as search costs 
parameters to be estimated. The model has three states; non-participation, un­
employment (search) and re-employment and it assumes that both the value of 
employment and the value of unemployment are directly affected by child care 
costs which are allowed to be state dependent. State dependence is, in our opin­
ion, an important issue since it allows to take into account that search activities 
are potentially less time-consuming than full time work and that some child care 
costs can therefore be avoided while unemployed. This creates an asymmetry 
in the effects that the presence of young children have on the net value of being 
unemployed and the net value of accepting employment respectively. Note that 
the existence of subsidized child care for low wage women (as it is the case in 
Canada) as well as tax deductions for child care costs while employed can also 
explain potential asymmetries between unemployed and employed child care 
costs.
Athough stylized, the model is informative; it predicts that the decision 
to search is decreasing in child status but that, for those who decide to search, 
reservation wages and search spell lengths are potentially raised (or lowered) 
by the presence of young children if child care costs at re-employment exceed 
(are lower than) child care costs while unemployed. As a result, the model 
also admits the possibility of positive as well as negative correlation between 
re-employment wages and fertility.
The model is estimated with the Canadian Labour market activity Survey4. 
We use a sample of women who have experienced a permanent job displacement 
and who report having children aged less than 4 years old at the time of the 
displacement. The likelihood function is based on information on the decision 
to search or not to search upon displacement (we refer to this as participation 
data), duration data and re-employment wages.
The paper is constructed as follows. In the next section, the theoretical 
model is presented in details. Section 3 is devoted to the discussion of econo­
metric issues and the presentation of the likelihood function. The data set is 
presented in details in Section 4 while Section 5 is devoted to the presentation 
of the main results. The conclusion is in Section 6.





























































































2 A M odel of Job Search Decision and Job  
Search Behaviour w ith Child Care Costs
To illustrate the effects that young children have on the search behaviour of un­
employed females, we specify a stationary search model that incorporates some 
features which allow us to tackle issues related to child care costs. The model 
is applied to female workers (full-time) who are affected by job displacement. 
We disregard temporary layoffs. The model is constructed around the following 
assumptions.
1. Expected lifetime earnings are maximized over an infinite horizon and 
discounted at rate 0  = - ^
2. Women receive at most one offer per period and the probability of receiv­
ing an offer is given by £. To be general enough, we consider cases where 
the presence of young children affect the likelihood of receiving an offer.
5
where K denotes the number of children.
3. Unemployed women received unemployment benefit b for each period of 
unemployment.
4. Child care costs per time period differ according to whether a woman 
is unemployed (searching), not searching (not in the labour force) or re­
employed. The chid care costs functions during employment and unem­
ployment are given respectively by
r e{ K )= 7 '0I (K  > 0) +7*1#
ru(A ')= 7uo /(A '> 0)+ 7ui^
where I(.) denotes the indicator function and K denotes the number of 
young children at the time of the job displacement. The parameters 7e0 
and 7„o are interpreted as fixed costs. For those women who decide not 
to search, child care costs are given by
rn (K) = 0 5
5This might be explained empirically by the fact that young children reduce women’s 




























































































Finally, we assume that search costs are entirely characterized by child 
care costs and that, for those women with no children, search is costless.
5. For those women who decide not to search, the value of non-market time 
(per period) is given by the following expression
/in =  — exp(Titf)
n
where a  can be interpreted as the monetary value of leisure and where 
yj- exp(riA') can be interpreted as the monetary value of the output pro­
duced at home.6
6. We assume that job offers are indexed by an hourly wage rate and that, 
upon acceptance, a job is held forever. Wage offers are distributed with 
density
f(w) = Aexp(—Xw)
Using the previous assumptions, it is straightforward to derive the value 
functions associated to each state. They are given by
W >  =  T^ r p ( w - v . ( K ) )  (i)
Vu = b -  r u(K) + PEV  (2)
vn = Y T p  ( “  exP (n ^ ) )  (3)
where Ve(w) is the value of accepting employment at wage w, Vu is the 
value of unemployment (search) and Vn is the value of leaving the labour force 
to involve in household activities. Applying Bellmann’s Principle of Optimality, 
EV, the value of following the optimal policy, is given by
EV = [(1 -  OrK)) K  -  r.(ff)] + Sn(W)E(w -  r e(K) I w > «;*)]
6For a woman with no child (when K=0), the value of non market time is given by ^  




























































































and where w* denotes the reemployment reservation wage (for those 
women who decide to search and remain in the labour force) and n(w‘) is the 
acceptance probability; that is the probability that an offer exceeds w*. Given 
assumption (7), EV can be expressed as
EV  = 1 w" -  Tt (K) +  Yexp(—Aw*)
A
which can be used to derive the equation for w* , that is
(4)
w' =b + T(K) + ^  exp(—Aw") (5)
where r ( /f )  =  Te(fc) — TU(K). Equation (5), usually referred to as the 
’’optimality condition”, illustrates the fact that, given the decision to search, 
the reservation wage (and therefore the duration of unemployment) is only 
affected by the difference in child care costs.7 Equation (5) is sometimes called 
the ’’optimality condition”. The necessary (and sufficient condition) to remain 
in the labour force and search (following displacement) is given by
expfa*)) < 6 -  ru(K) +/3EV = t ^  (w '  -  T.(K)) (6)
where w* is given by (5).
The model implies that unemployed females escape unemployment (for 
re-employment) at rate •d given by
tf =  £.exp(-Aifl*(r,£,A ,b,K)) (7)
Using (5), it is easy to see that the reservation wage is increasing in K 
when T'{K) > 0 and increasing in the offer arrival rate £. That is,
7It is easy to show that the optimality condition (equation 5) is actually a contraction 
mapping of modulus /3(1 — $7r(tv*)) < 1 . For more details, see Christensen and Kiefer (1991) 




























































































ry ( i  -  yg)
(8)
K (1 -  0(1 -  **(«•))
(9)
In the case where £ =  ipj  ̂ is evaluated using the product of ('(K) 
and (8) which must be added to (7).8 In the case where child care costs are 
perfectly symmetric across labor market states (for instance when search takes 
as much time as full time work) and f  is independent from K, then T(A') = 
T \K )  = 0 and children have no impact on re-employment wages (or reservation 
wages) as well as on the escape rate out of unemployment. When T(K) is 
positive (negative), children raise (lower) female reservation wages and lower 
(raise) the escape rate out of unemployment. If £ depends on K, the total effect 
of children on reservation wages is ambiguous and will depend on the value of 
appropriate parameters and so will the hazard rate.
3 Estim ation
In this section, we present the estimation strategy used to implement the the­
oretical model. Our main objective is to obtain estimates of all structural 
parameters of the model so that the following issues can be investigated;
• The effects of child care costs on the propensity to invest in search activ­
ities, on reservation (and re-employment) wages and on the escape rate 
out of unemployment.
• The effects of young children on the probability of receiving an offer and, 
indirectly, on reservation wages, on the escape rate out of unemployment 
and on the probability of dropping out of the labour force.
• The behavioral differences between married and lone mothers.
8Although K is typically an integer, (7) and (8) are presented for illustrative purposes. 
In Section 5, we simulate the effects of our parameter estimates on reservation wages and on 




























































































To avoid self-selection bias introduced if we were to sample only those 
women searching and therefore work with duration and wage data (such as it is 
typically done in the previous literature), we make use of the sample information 
on the willingness to search or not upon job displacement as reported in the 
LMAS. Our model is therefore distinct from those of van den Berg (1991), Flinn 
and Heckman (1982) and Wolpin (1987), among others, where the decision to 
search is typically ignored. To incorporate participation data in a meaningful 
way and take into account individual unobserved heterogeneity in the value 
of non market time, we allow the value of non-market time to incorporate a 
stochastic element. That is
Hn = a +  —  exp(riK)
T\
We assume that a  is normally distributed;
a  ~  Normal (/_i,cr2)
If we let Si =  1 for those women who decided to search and 0 for those 
who dropped out and using the condition expressed in (6), the probability that 
a woman i will search is given by
P(Si = l) = P[a<h{w')} = $ M O
a
where




where $>(.) denotes the standard normal cdf and where w* is given by the 
optimality condition ( 5). The probability that woman i will not search is given 
by
P(Si =  0) = P  [a > fc(O) =  1 -  $ a
As it is the case in most economic surveys of the unemployed, some of the 
women reporting that they are searching are still unemployed by the end of the 
survey time. For those women, we only observe a censored unemployment du­




























































































a completed duration t< and a re-employment hourly wage w,. Completed ob­
servations are indexed by the binary variable Cj =  1 while censored observations 
are indexed by c, =  0.
Given that a woman i decides to search, the probability that she is ob­
served reemployed at wage w, after t, periods or that she is still unemployed by 
the end of the survey time is given by
(1 -  ^ « ) ) t<- 1̂ « ) AeXP/, ^ W%) ' " ....................... ..  ^n(wi ) { ( 1 - ^ ( 0 ) * * }
The log likelihood function for the entire sample is therefore given by
i( \ ,TUr,o) E  los
i:Si= 0
+ E  los ̂
i:Si=1 G
log {(! — £7T(wi))ti 1̂ ex p (-A w i)}C,{ ( l - ^ 7 T « ) ) ‘‘}1 (12)
A thorough examination of the structure of the log likelihood along with 
the optimality condition and the participation (search) conditions reveals that 
the following parameters can be identified (and estimated). These include the 
variance of a (a) , the parameter of the function representing female productivity 
at home (ti), the wage offer distribution parameter (A), the difference in fixed 
and variable child care costs parameters 7 =  7e — 7u, the child care costs while 
unemployed yu, and the offer probability (£).9 Maximization of the log likelihood 
function is rendered difficult by the fact that, at each iteration , w* must be 
evaluated conditional on the values of the structural parameters. To do so, we 
make use of the optimality condition (equation 5) and we define the following 
implicit equation
g(w') = w ' - b -  r (K) - f t
(1-/?)A exp(-Aw*) = 0





























































































It is easy to see that g’(w') > 0 and g” (w*) < 0. Using a Newton-Raphson 
procedure, the value of w* which solves this relationship can be obtained rel­
atively easily although these calculations must be updated at each iteration 
needed to maximize the log likelihood function.10
A notable feature of the likelihood function is that, contrary to structural 
search models where agents are assumed to be identical and where inference 
is solely based on duration and wage data (such as in Christensen and Kiefer 
1991, 1993), it is purely regular. That is the score for each structural parameter 
of the reservation wage equation (including T) can be equated to 0.11 This is 
explained by the introduction of participation data (the decision to search or 
not) which allows us to obtain draws of the value of non market time on either 
side of the re-employment reservation wages while, in standard empirical search 
models where the decision to search is ignored, wages are observed only at the 
right of the reservation wage12. Furthermore, as we incorporate information 
on individual UI benefit level and child status for each women, the optimal 
reservation wage is therefore not restricted to be equal for all women (such as 
it is usually in empirical models based on a representative agent specifications.
4 The Canadian Labour Market A ctivity  Sur­
vey
The sample of women analyzed in this paper is drawn from the 1986-1987 
Canadian labour Market Activity Survey (LMAS). The LMAS is a longitudinal 
data set where the basic unit of observation is the job held by the respondent. 
The sample used contains only female workers who held a full time job and 
experienced a job displacement. The notion of displacement used in the paper 
includes layoffs for non-seasonal reasons, plant closure, end of a temporary job
10The reservation wage, at step p+1, is defined as
w~ l = w;- v k ) 9{w;)
and the maximization of the likelihood function is therefore very time consuming. 
n It is very common in optimal stopping problems that the score with respect to parameters 
characterizing the optimal policy is strictly positive over the parameter space. For examples 
of optimal stopping problems in economics, see Rust (1987) or Christensen and Kiefer (1991, 
1993).





























































































and a dismissal by the employer. It is therefore consistent with the notion of 
displacement used in the empirical literature. In the LMAS, the duration of 
unemployment is computed from the difference between the starting week of 
the new job (when applicable) and the week of termination of the previous 
job. As documented by Jones and Riddell (1995), the exact nature of the 
non-employment spell is not clear. Every individual is asked to report their 
weekly status (whether they are searching, not searching but willing to work 
or simply not available to work) so the post-displacement status is actually a 
complex sequence of states which, in many cases, might not be consistent with a 
stationary search model where individuals decide (upon displacement) to search 
or not. However, the LMAS also report a unique state recorded from a ’filter’. 
This filter is based on the aggregate female unemployment rate for 1896 and 
1987 and it computes a minimum number of weeks of search to be classified as 
unemployed and searching. Those individuals who do not have this minimum 
of weeks are recorded as dropping out of the labour force.
In the LMAS, hourly wages as well as hours per week are reported for all 
jobs sampled. This allows us to construct a measure of the level of unemploy­
ment benefit received for those who report having received UI benefit. To do 
so, we use the fact that, in 1986, the maximum insurable earnings were 495$ 
per week and the replacement ratio was 60%. On top of the information on the 
decision to search, upon-employment duration and accepted wages, the LMAS 
reports information on the number of young children so that we can identify 
those women who had children when displacement took place. We also observe 
the marital status (whether married , divorced, single or cohabitating) so that 
lone mothers and married mothers can be analyzed separately.
Overall, the sample is composed of young women. Around 35% of the 
women are under 20, 24% are between 20 and 34 and 16% between 35 and 
44 years old. Women above 45 represent 15% of our original sample and will 
not be analyzed. The education background of the women of the sample is as 
follows. About 10% only have completed at most a high school degree while 
32% have attended university. The majority (58%) reports having completed 
a post-secondary degree ( technical school).Censoring is quite important in the 
data. Among 833 women aged below 45, 275 only had found a new job by the 
end of the survey. The remaining 558 women are split between those who were 
still searching at the end of the survey and those who report not searching after 
the loss of their previous job.
The tables enclosed in Appendix (Table A1 and A2) illustrate the char­




























































































5 Empirical R esults
In this section, we present and interpret the main results obtained after imple­
menting the model described in previous sections. As a first step, we implement 
the model on the entire sample of women aged 45 or less (the sample size is 
833). In section 5.1.1, we estimate a model where heterogeneity is captured in 
individual variations in UI benefit and children status and where women are 
grouped by age classes. The parameters are therefore common to all women 
(within a given age group) and we refer to it as a representative agent model. 
Subsequently (section 5.1.2), we consider model specifications where offer prob­
abilities axe affected by children status (in order to capture the potential re­
strictions on search intensity for women who have young children) and where 
both the mean wage offer (A) and the productivity parameter at home (rj) are 
allowed to differ according to the education classes. Secondly (in 5.2), we inves­
tigate the behavioral differences between single and married mothers .The third 
section (5.3) is devoted to the simulation of the effects of children on various 
labour market variables of interest (such as the effect on reservation wages,the 
escape rate out of unemployment, the drop-out probability and the acceptance 
probability) using structural point estimates obtained in sub-sections 5.1 and 
5.2
5.1 Full Sam ple A nalysis
The model is first estimated on the entire sample. It is originally assumed that 
the dynamic optimization behaviour of single and married (or cohabitating) 
women can be described by a representative agent model. The original sample 
contains 833 women who have experienced a permanent job displacement. The 
model has been first estimated on three separate age groups; women age 24 or 
less, those between 25 and 34 and women between 35-45. The results are in 
Table 1A. Thereafter, we consider generalizations of the model where the wage 
offer location parameter (A), productivity at home (ti) and the offer probability 
(£) are allowed to depend on various regressors.
5.1.1 5.1.1 A Representative Agent Model
The results are found in columns 1,2 and 3 of Table 1A. The point estimate for 
T\ (.422 for those women 24 or less) indicates that the value of non market time 




























































































child and 5.46$ for a woman with two children. For those women between 25 and
34, the values of non-market time are respectively equal to 1.82$, 3.15$ and 5.47$ 
while, for those between 35-44, they are 4.05$, 5.18$ and 6.64$. Altogether, 
these estimates imply that the presence of young children raises the likelihood 
of dropping-out of the labor force (and not to search). However, the estimates 
for a (3.09, 3.19 and 2.25) indicate that there is significant heterogeneity across 
women . Our estimate for £ (the offer probability) indicates that unemployed 
females have between 4% and 10% chance of receiving an offer each week while 
the estimate for A imply that the mean wage offer of 2.39$ per hour for women 
below 25 and around 3.45$ per hour for those above 25.
Interestingly, the parameter estimates capturing the effects of child status 
(the difference between employment and unemployment child care costs, 71) 
indicate that women below 25 and women between 25 and 34 have lower reser­
vation wages if they have young children (the unemployment child care costs are 
3.57$ and 1.22$ respectively) and are therefore consistent with the hypothesis 
that unemployed child care costs are higher than employment child care costs 
or, perhaps, that reemployment child care costs are actually disregraded by un­
employed females. Although the difference seems even higher for women above
35, the very high variability implies that the null hypothesis that re-employment 
and unemployment child care costs are equal cannot be rejected.13 To summa­
rize, the results indicate that children raise propensity to withdraw as well as 
reuse unemployed search costs and therefore decrease female reservation wages. 
As a consequence, the escape rate out of unemployment, £.exp(-Atc*(7 , A,£, /?)), 
is expected to be higher for unemployed females with young children.14 The 
analysis of the hazard rate implied by thee structural parameters will however 
be delayed to section 5.3
13In the representative agent model, the reservation wage ranges from a minimum 1.86$ to 
a maximum of 7.37$ per hour and averages 6.27$ over all individuals. The legal minimum 
wage for the period in question is around 3.25$ per hour.
14The model has been re-estimated with fixed child care costs (7„o and 7«o) as well as 
variable costs. However, the data could not distinguish between fixed and variable costs 
child status. This is likely explained by the fact that, in our sample, very few women have 
more than one child so fixed and variable costs are therefore hardly distinguishable. Other 




























































































Table 1A- R epresentative Agent M odel
Age Group (24 or less) (25-34) (35-44)
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Parameter (TRatio) (TRatio) (Tratio)
Unobs. heterogeneity (a) 3.09 (0.89) 3.19 (4.12) 2.25 (3.44)
Home Productivity (ti) 0.423 (0.37) 0.550 (1.45) 0.247 (2.63)
Unem. childcare costs (7 i„) 3.570 (0.77) 1.217 (0.90) -1.24 (0.02)
A childcare costs (71) -1.73 (1.84) -2.103 (2.54) -3.092 (0.07)
offer probability (£) .099 (4.49) .040 (2.87) .084 (1.97)
Wage offer A 0.419 (16.8) 0.289 (6.64) 0.291 (4.90)
Log Likelihood -433.0 -467.5 -243.3
Sample size 345 329 159
5.1.2 5.1.2 Models with Parameterizations
In what follows, we generalize the model to incorporate parametrization of the 
offer probability, the parameter representing home productivity and the mean 
wage offer . The results are in Table IB and 1C. We allow the offer probability 
to depend on child status. This might be relevant if for instance, those women 
with young children searching for a new job are less flexible or have less time 
to devote to search activities. To take this into account, we specify the offer 
probability as
f  = exp(-f0 -ZiK)
where both £0 and £1 are positive parameters.
Models such as those presented in 1A can also be criticized for ignoring the 
fact that females with different level of education (human capital) do not search 
from a same distribution. In standard regression analysis of female earnings, 
the number of regressors usually included is large. Given that the LMAS does 
not give a detailed age and a detailed level of schooling, we use the previous 
wage (earned at the time of the job separation). The previous wage is likely 
correlated with schooling, occupation and unobserved ability. As our objective 
is to estimate the structural parameters of the effects of young children on 
search costs and reservation wages, we do not give a structural interpretation of 
the regressors included in the mean wage offer equation but rather incorporate 




























































































in human capital. For this reason, we parametrize the parameter of the offer 
distribution as
A =  exp(Ao +  Aiprimary + \ 3Univers1ty + \ 4previcn1s wage)
where primary and university are dummy variables indicating the highest 
degree attained by a given woman. Note that the most important groups (those 
who have a high school degree) are the reference group.
Finally, we also allow the marginal productivity at home (ri) to be a 
function of education in order to take into account that women with more 
human capital are likely to be also more productive at home. We specify T\ as 
follows
T\ =  exp(rio +  Tn primary +  TuUniversity)
Two sets of results are presented. In Table IB. In the first one (column 1), only 
the inverse mean wage offer is parameterized. The version presented is the one 
obtained when previous wage is used to control for labor market opportunities.15 
A second set of estimates, where the home marginal productivity parameter (ri) 
is allowed to depend on education and where the arrival rate (£) is allowed to 
depend on young children is found in Table 1C. The results in Table IB indicate 
that, once labour market opportunities are allowed to be affected by education 
and previous wages, the effect of child status on reservation wages (coming 
from search costs) becomes much less significant than in the representative 
agent specification. In particular, net search costs for females between 25 and 
34 appear particularly insignificant (-.75 $ with a t-ratio of 1.12). As expected, 
women with university training and women who earned more before separation 
also receive better paying job offers (except for women above 35).
The specification in Table 1C (our preferred specification) is much more 
general. It allows child status to affect job offers probability while education is 
allowed to affect home productivity as well as potential wages. We can therefore 
investigate two potential channels by which young children affect female reser­
vation wages; the offer probability and search costs. The results indicate that 
when young children Eire allowed to affect search behaviour, the search costs be­
come much smaller (.42$ for those below 25 and -.80 $ for those between 25 and
15A version has also been estimated only with education. We did not obtain any notable 
differences in signs and significance of the main parameters of interest (home productivity, 




























































































34) and virtually negligeable as the search cost parameter estimate have very 
high standard errors. Although search costs are also insignificant for women 
above 35, the estimates are substantially higher (-1.99). The parameter esti­
mates of the effects of children on the offer probability (-.36, -.48 and -.32) point 
out (except for older women) that the presence of young children reduces the 
probability that a woman receives a job offer and, therefore, the value of search 
activities.16. As it would be predicted by human capital theory, the parame­
terization of the productivity in child care activities indicates that women with 
university background are also more productivities at home than those with less 
education.
Our results can therefore be summarized as follows. The representative 
agent model indicates that unemployment search cost are relatively more im­
portant than child care costs born at re-employment. As a result, females with 
no children will accept re-employment at -wages typically higher than women 
who search in the presence of young children. However, when we allow women 
with more education to be more productive in the labour market as well as at 
home and allow children to affect the rate at which female receive wages, we 
find that employment and unemployment child care costs are practically equal 
and that female with young children have lower reservation wages simply be­
cause they receive wage offers at a lower rate; that is young children reduce the 
mobility of young women.
16We also considered the case where education affects the probability of receiving an of­
fer but our results have indicated that education does not seem to affect significantly the 






























































































Table IB - M odel w ith Param eterization o f the M ean W age
Age G roup 24 or less 25-34 35-44
-1- -2 - -3-
P aram eter Coeff. (Tratio) CoefT. (Tratio) Coeff. (T-Ratio)
a 2.876 (3.17) 4.014 (5.98) 0.822 (0.33)
T \
Ti0
7*1 prim ary  
Tiuniversity
0.320 (2.18) 0.637 (5.05) 0.219 (2.81)




.034 (5.04) 0.029 (3.56) 0.051 (1.86)
Ao -1.029 (8.29) -.730 (3.75) -1.392 (4.35)
^prim ary 0.315 (0.22) -0.213 (1.23) -0.003 (0.01)
^u n ivers ity -0.293 (2.59) -0.283 (3.58) .-.Oil (0.32)
^prev.wage -0.022 (1.56) -0.064 (2.18) -0.030 (0.34)
Log Likelihood -443.4 -487.6 -223.7
Table lC -M odel w ith Param eterization of the  Offer Probability, 
the  M ean Wage Offer and  the Home P roductiv ity  P aram eter.






P aram eter Coeff. (Tratio) Coeff.(T-Ratio) Coeff. (T -ratio)
a 4.925 (3.50) 3.196 (3.55) 4.583 (0.80)
TiO -0.965 (1.20) -0.952 (1.87) -1.909 (2.59)
lprim ary 0.332 (1.71) -0.490 (0.89) 0.127 (0.12)




0.422 (0.58) -0.795 (0.88) -1.991 (0.23)
-2.960 (10.9) -3.250 (10.6) -2.927 (4.86)
-Ci(K) -0.358 (1.89) -0.484 (2.63) -0.320 (0.48)
Ao -0.685 (3.87) -0.881 (6.44) -1.413 (6.07)
^prim ary 0.141 (0.72) 0.019 (0.10) 0.363 (0.30)
^un ivers ity -1.127 (1.71) -0.251 (1.73) -0.129 (0.66)
^prev.wage -0.055 (2.27) -0.038 (1.81) .009 (0.58)




























































































5.2 M arried and Lone M others
This section is devoted to the separate analysis of women who are married (in­
cluding those who are cohabitating) and women who are single. This distinction 
is likely to be important as those women who are married (or are cohabitat­
ing) might have access to other financial support (unreported in the LMAS) 
than only unemployment benefit. First, we have implemented the model with 
parameterization of the mean wage offer distribution to a sub-sample of 483 
married (co-habitating) women and a sub-sample of 350 single women. To keep 
a sufficiently high number of observations, we pooled all three age groups but 
incorporate age as a regressor in the mean wage offer function (ta save space, 
the parameters associated to age groups are not reported.
Overall, the results for married women are quite similar to those obtained 
for the full sample. We however note two important distinctions. In particular, 
the estimate for T\ (.367) imply that the value of non market time of married 
women is (on average) 2.72$ per hour with no child, 3.92$ in the presence of 
one child and 5.67$ with 2 children. The estimate for T\ (0.86) for single women 
suggest that they are less productive in absence of children (1.16 $ per hour) 
and equally productive with one child (2.74$ per hour) but are substantially 
more productive at home with two children (6.48$). It is worth noticed that 
the equality of unemployment search costs and employment child care costs fail 
to be rejected for single women as well as married women, it is particularly 




























































































Table 2A- M arried and Single W omen (Param eterization o f the
M ean W age Offer).
Married Single
Parameter Coeff. (T-ratio) Coeff. (T-Ratio)
a 3.397 (2.02) 3.258 (3.16)
T\ 0.367 (0.96) 0.863 (6.43)
l u i 0.854 (0.60) 1.136 (0.17)
7i -0.948 (1.48) -2.46 (0.70)
« 0.042 (4.25) 0.014 (4.81)
Ao -1.179 (10.35) -1.699 (3.02)
Aprimary -.062 (0.84) 0.186 (0.20)
Auniversity -.015 (1.86) -0.122 (3.64)
Aprev.Wage -.015 (.07) -0.039 (0.70)
Log Likelihood -572.2 -466.0
In Table 2B, we implement our most general model specification (same
as Table 1C) to both single and married women. The parameter estimates (in 
Table 2B) also indicate some notable differences between married and single 
women. The structural parameters representing the effect of university train­
ing on home production indicate that married women who are more educated 
are also more productive in household activities. Although the corresponding 
parameter for single women is almost identical, it as a large standard error and 
is therefore insignificant. A comparison of the effects of search costs on reser­
vation wages reveals that the difference is negative (-.50$) for married women 
and positive (.40$) for single women but that, in both cases, the difference 
is insignificant. We however note that , for married mothers (and unlike for 
lone mothers), the null hypothesis that offers are received independently from 
child status fails to be rejected. This is perphaps the most striking difference 
between married and single mothers. Finally, in order to test homogeneity in 
the search behaviour of married and single women, we have estimated a fully 
parameterized model on the full sample. The restricted model (along with both 
unrestricted models presented in Table 2B) lead to a likelihood ratio statistic 
of 48 , well beyond the critical value at a 1% confidence level (around 30 for a 
X2 with 15 restrictions)17
17The parameter estimates in the restricted model (quite similar to those obtained for 
married women) also indicated that more educated women are more productive at home and 
in the labor market, that women with young children receive job offers at a significantly lower 






























































































M odels for Single and M arried W omen (w ith P aram eterization)
M arried Single
P aram eter Coefficient T -R atio Coefficient T-R atio
a 3.638 (6.41) 3.710 (2.92)
no -1.263 (3.92) -1.133 (1.63)
7" 1 primary -0.104 (0.20) 0.917 (0.20)
7"l university 1.200 (2.60) 1.202 (0.92)
7l -0.495 (0.84) 0.401 (0.15)
£o -3.045 (11.71) -2.452 (6.86)
6(K) -0.603 (3.09) -0.112 (0.03)
Ao -1.210 (9.24) -0.761 (5.94)
Aprimary -0.002 (0.07) 0.635 (0.69)
Auniversity -0.177 (1.71) -0.890 (1.20)
Aprev.wage -0.133 (1.04) -0.022 (1.67)
Sample 483 350
Log Likelihood -541.9 -422.6
5.3 S im ulating th e effects o f C hildren on P articipation  
D ecisions, R eservation  wages and R e-E m ploym ent 
Hazards
In this section, we compute the numerical values of the effects that children 
have on reservation wages (and therefore mean accepted wages), on the du­
ration of unemployment (re-employment hazards), the acceptance probability 
and on the probability of specializing in household (child care) activities using 
the maximum likelihood point estimates obtained from various model specifi­
cations. Without loss of generality, we evaluate those economic variables at 
the mean level of UI benefit in the particular group considered. As some spec­
ifications have introduced education as a key variable (using standard human 
capital arguments), we analyze women with no child and those with one young 
child and split each group between two groups; those with university training 
and those with no university training. When needed, we also fix the level of the 
previous wage to an average.
The model is simulated using estimates obtained from the representative 
agent model (Table 3A) and on the fully parameterized version (Table 3B). 




























































































25 and 34 in Table 3B. Estimates in Table 3A illustrate the impact of children 
quite clearly, the reservation wage can drop from 5.22 $ per hour down to 1.76$ 
per hour when K goes from 0 to 2 (for young women). As a consequence, the 
escape rate out of unemployment raises substantially with K while acceptance 
probabilities are also higher for females with young children. As expected, the 
model implies that the probability non-participation (no search) is increasing 
sharply with K.
The simulations for the fully parameterized model (Table 3B) indicate 
also a similar decrease in reservation wages explained by children. However,as 
point estimates of the fully parameterized model indicated that lower reservation 
wages for females with young children were explained by lower offer probabili­
ties, we observe lower hazards increasease with child status despite much larger 
acceptance probabilities for women with young children.
The distinction between married and single mothers is well illustrated 
in table 4A and 4B. From Table 4A, we see that married women with chil­
dren have much lower reservation wages but escape unemployment at rate only 
slightly higher. In Table 4B, we observe that, as pointed out earlier, child status 
has virtually no impact on search behaviour of single women; both reservation 
wages and unemployment hazard rates are marginally affected by the presence 
of young children,
Table 3A- Simulations for the Full Sample (Representative Agent 
Model)
16-24 25-34 35-44
K=0 K=1 K=2 K=0 K=1 K=2 K=0 K=1 K=2
Variable
w* 5.22 3.48 1.76 7.34 5.23 3.13 10.31 7.21 4.13
£.n(w') .01 .02 .05 .005 .009 .016 .004 .01 .026
.18 .74 .93 .04 .18 .57 .01 .01 .01
n(w') .11 .23 .48 .12 .22 .41 .05 .12 .30
Table 3B- Simulations for the Parameterized Model1 (25-34)
K=0 K=1 K=0 K=1
Variable low education low education high education high education
w* 6.08 3.79 10.44 6.48
£.7r(lU*) .005 .007 .003 .005
! - * [ * ? ] .28 .37 .01 .03




























































































Table 4A- Sim ulations for M arried W omen (25-34)
(Fully Param eterized  Model)
K=0 K=1 K=0 K=1
Variable low education low education high education high education
w* 7.62 4.62 11.30 6.63
£.7r(w‘) .006 .007 .004 .006
.15 .33 .01 .05
.13 .28 .08 .22
Table 4B- Sim ulations for Single W omen (25-34)
(Fully Param eterized  models)
K=0 K=1 K=0 K=1
Variable low education low education high education high education
w* 1.45 1.85 5.79 6.14
£.7r(uj*) .028 .020 .010 .009
!-*  [ ^ ] .01 .01 .03 .03
n(w*) .33 .24 .11 .10
6 Conclusion
It is generally recognized that young children have important impact on both 
consumption and time allocation outcomes of households. In this paper, we have 
analyzed an aspect which, to our knowledge, has so far been ignored; namely 
the impact of young children on the job search behaviour of female displaced 
workers. In particular, we have examined two possible channels by which young 
children affect re-employment outcomes; the presence of child care costs and the 
possible reduction in the probability of receiving offers for those women who 
have young children and are therefore less effective at search activities.
Our representative agent model indicates that women with young children 
are more likely to drop-out from the labour force (as expected) and those who 
search for a job absorb substantial child care costs while unemployed and there­
fore accept re-employment at lower wages than those who have no children. 
However, the parameterized version of the model where offer probabilities are 
also affected by the presence of young children indicates quite clearly that child 




























































































reservation wage and is therefore consistent with the claim that unemployment 
child care costs and re-employment child care costs are approximately equal. 
Instead, the presence of young children has a substantial (and significant) neg­
ative impact on the probability of receiving offers and female decrease their 
reservation wages accordingly.
Our results also indicate some differences between married and lone moth­
ers. Lone mothers are more productive at home and drop out in larger numbers 
(they are typically younger, have less experience and receive less UI benefits), 
but those who search are much less affected by young children than married 
women. Indeed, our estimates indicated that lone mothers are unemployed 
much shorter than married mothers.
As a result, both the representative agent model specification and the 
parametrized version of the model are consistent with the negative relationship 
between female wages and family size; a stylized fact observed in almost all 
western countries. This is interesting. If family size truly reduces the search 
effectiveness of young women and if we extend our results to job search activities 
while employed, then job search behaviour can undoubtedly be a major factor 
in the persistence of a gender wage gap. We therefore suggest that some effort 
should be devoted to modelling the gender wage jointly with job search activities 
along with other forms of human capital investment.
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Sample All Married Single
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev
Unemp. Dur. 23.0 16.2 24 16 22 16
Dur. Prev. Job 89 181.8 98 181.5 77 182.0
Prev. wage 6.51$ 3.35 6.80 3.54 6.11 3.01
UI Ben. 1.85$ 4.01 2.09$ 2.35 1.51 2.19
#  of Children 0.28 0.40 .12
Acc. wage 6.62 $ 4.28
% univ. degreee 0.32 .30 .34
Table A2
Empirical Frequencies of Non-Participation by Education/Children  
Classes with Number of Observations in each Cell in Parantheses.
K=0 K=1 K>2
Primary .07 (79) .13 (15) 0(3)
Secondary .08 (442) .06 (91) .08 (36)
University .02 (250) .09 (46) .05 (18)
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